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How	damaging	would	a	‘no-deal’	Brexit	be?
The	UK’s	decision	to	leave	the	EU	has	created	huge
uncertainty	over	what	sort	of	trade	agreement	we	might
have	with	the	bloc	in	the	future,	and	the	resulting	tariffs
that	UK	firms	can	expect	to	pay	in	order	to	export	to	the
EU.	Meredith	Crowley,	Giancarlo	Corsetti,	Oliver
Exton,	and	Lu	Han	(Cambridge	University)	explain	how
damaging	a	‘no-deal’	scenario	would	actually	be.
Leaving	the	Customs	Union	will	open	up	firms	in	the	UK	to	further	potential	trade	restrictions	introduced	by	the	EU
under	the	World	Trade	Organization’s	laws	on	anti-dumping	orders,	countervailing	duties	and	safeguards.
This	uncertainty	has	been	compounded	by	the	Trump	administration’s	action	over	UK	access	to	the	valuable	US
markets.	As	a	result,	firms	in	the	UK	now	have	to	decide	whether	to	enter	new	foreign	markets,	continue	in
established	markets,	or	invest	in	their	productive	capacity	without	knowing	much	about	their	future	access	to	these
markets.
Such	uncertainty	can	have	permanent	effects	on	an	economy	by	reducing	the	incentive	for	firms	to	invest.
In	the	case	of	trade	policy,	a	recent	study	quantified	the	impact	of	an	increase	in	trade	policy	uncertainty	on	Chinese
exporters	and	found	that	threats	of	tariff	increases	–	that	never	actually	materialised	-reduced	Chinese	exports	by	at
least	$28	billion	over	2001-2009.	Even	when	the	current	uncertainty	about	UK	access	to	markets	around	the	world	is
resolved,	a	concern	is	that	decisions	being	made	or	delayed	today	will	be	likely	to	have	permanent	negative	impacts
on	the	UK	economy.
To	try	to	clarify	matters,	we	conducted	a	detailed	analysis	of	the	exposure	of	UK	exports	to	EU	tariffs	under	a	“no
deal”	scenario.	We	identified,	by	product	classification,	the	value	of	UK	exports	to	the	EU	facing	trade	policy
uncertainty.
Our	view	is	that	there	are	four	major	sources	of	trade	policy	uncertainty	facing	firms	in	the	UK:
(1)	uncertainty	over	the	baseline	tariffs	and	quotas	the	EU	will	impose	on	imports	from	the	UK	in	the
future;
(2)	uncertainty	over	the	special	trade	barriers	that	the	EU	might	impose	in	the	future	under	antidumping
rules,	countervailing	duties	and	safeguards;
(3)	uncertainty	over	the	baseline	tariffs	and	quotas	in	77	of	the	UK’s	trading	partners	which	maintain	Free
Trade	Agreements	with	the	EU;
(4)	uncertainty	over	special	trade	barriers	that	the	US	is	imposing	under	the	Trump	administration.
The	first	two,	which	we	shall	discuss	here,	represent	the	most	pressing	and	quantifiable	sources	of	trade	policy
uncertainty	facing	firms	in	the	UK	following	statements	by	both	the	UK	and	EU	that	“no	deal”	is	a	realistic	potential
outcome.
Regarding	the	first	source	of	uncertainty,	our	starting	point	is	that	the	UK	is	a	full	member	of	the	WTO	and	has	the
right	to	remain	a	member	of	the	WTO	after	leaving	the	EU.	Therefore,	the	highest	possible	import	tariffs	that	firms	in
the	UK	will	face	to	export	to	the	EU	in	a	“no	deal”	scenario	are	determined	by	the	EU’s	WTO	commitments.	This
means	that	some	products	will	be	able	to	enter	the	EU	tariff-free,	but	others	might	be	subject	to	high	tariffs	or
restrictive	quotas.
Turning	to	the	second	point	of	uncertainty,	we	observe	that	around	the	world,	members	of	FTAs	frequently	use	anti-
dumping	duties	against	one	another	–	thus,	the	UK	could	easily	become	the	target	of	antidumping	duties	into	the	EU.
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This	is	not	as	far-fetched	as	it	sounds:	the	EU	is	one	of	the	most	active	users	of	trade	remedies	in	the	world,	with	8.1
per	cent	of	imported	products	subject	to	a	trade	remedy	over	1995-2013.	Moreover,	high-income	countries	frequently
target	each	other	with	these	import	policies.
Image	by	Andrew
Skudder,	(Flickr),	licenced	under	CC	BY-SA	2.0.
Currently,	the	US	restricts	imports	of	British	steel	wire	rod	because	a	2016	US	investigation	found	that	British	firms
were	dumping	steel	in	the	US	market,	while	a	major	concern	for	the	UK	today	is	the	US	anti-subsidy	tariff	against
Bombadier	jets	from	Canada,	which	will	hit	UK	exports	of	aircraft	wings.
Figures	1	and	2	use	data	from	the	WTO	and	the	World	Bank	on	product-level	tariffs,	quotas	and	trade	remedy
measures	along	with	trade	flow	data	from	UN	Comtrade	to	quantify	the	trade	policy	uncertainty	facing	firms	exporting
from	Britain	to	the	EU.	We	use	data	on	UK	exports	to	the	EU	in	2015	and	provide	two	granular	breakdowns	of	this
trade	policy	risk.	In	figure	1,	we	provide	a	breakdown	based	on	product	classification	(the	acronyms	are	provided	in
Table	A).	In	figure	2,	we	organise	the	same	information	into	UK	Standard	Industrial	Classifications	to	show	which
industries	are	most	exposed.
Figure	1:
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To	start	with	the	good	news,	we	calculate	that	34	per	cent	of	UK	exports	to	the	EU	will	remain	tariff-free	under	a	“no
deal”	scenario,	as	long	as	the	UK	remains	a	member	of	the	WTO.	The	green	bars	in	both	figures	represent	the	value
of	UK	exports	that	face	no	trade	policy	uncertainty	in	exporting	to	the	EU	–	even	under	a	“no	deal”	Brexit,	these
exports	will	pay	no	tariffs	and	face	no	quantitative	restrictions	in	the	EU.
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From	figure	1,	we	can	see	that	these	tariff-free	exports	are	largely	in	fuels	and	chemicals.	Figure	2	refines	the	large
chemical	product	group	into	chemicals	and	pharmaceuticals	and	shows	that	most	pharmaceutical	exports	will	enter
the	EU	duty-free	even	if	the	UK	leaves	the	EU	without	a	deal.
Similarly,	blue	bars	quantify	the	value	of	exports	that	face	low	uncertainty	–	worst-case	scenario	tariffs	of	1-5	per
cent	ad	valorem.	Concern	rises	for	yellow	exports	where	tariffs	could	rise	to	5-10	per	cent.	The	UK’s	main	concern
comes	from	the	orange	exports	suffering	high	uncertainty	with	EU	tariffs	that	could	rise	to	11-15	per	cent	and	the	red
exports	exposed	to	extreme	levels	of	trade	policy	uncertainty	–	a	worst	case	ad	valorem	tariff	over	15	per	cent	or	the
imposition	of	a	quota	or	an	EU	trade	remedy.
The	bad	news	is	that	27	per	cent	of	UK	exports	face	high	or	extreme	trade	policy	barriers	in	a	“no	deal”	scenario	(this
is	represented	by	the	sum	of	the	orange	and	red	bars	in	the	figures).	Products	facing	a	risk	of	high	or	extreme	trade
policy	barriers	are	predominantly	concentrated	in	high-skilled	and	technologically	advanced	manufactured	products
including	transportation	equipment	and	machinery.	There	is	also	considerable	risk	facing	one	of	the	UK’s
environmentally-friendly	exports	–	biodiesel	–	a	high-value	export	that	has	been	the	target	of	EU	anti-dumping
activity.
In	summary,	if	the	UK	leaves	the	EU	with	no	trade	deal,	firms	in	the	UK	will	face	significant	policy	barriers	to	export	to
the	EU	across	a	wide	range	of	products.	Under	a	“no	deal”	scenario,	$47	billion	of	UK	exports	to	the	EU	would	face
high	or	extreme	tariffs,	quotas	or	anti-dumping	duties.	If	the	UK	chooses	to	leave	the	Customs	Union	and	attempts	to
negotiate	a	bespoke	trade	deal	with	the	EU,	then	these	products	should	be	the	priority	in	the	trade	negotiations.
	
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	authors	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.	It	originally	featured	on
CapX.
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